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gested that this co-authority exists as a matter of comity between the
two branches of the government, and that it is a recognition by the
court that both departments should function because it is not clear that
either should have exclusive control.50
Incidentally, the State Bar Act was not constitutionally weakened by
the provision that51 "neither a councillor nor any officer .. .of the
State Bar shall be deemed as such to fie a public officer as that phrase
is used in the Constitution or laws of the State of North Carolina."
That was merely an ineffectual 52 attempt to prevent an attorney from
being ineligible to serve as an officer or councillor under the dual office-
holding ban of the state constitution, "3 in case he also happened to be a
notary public54 or county commissioner.
With respectful deference, it is submitted that the Council and
Superior Court in the principal case could have been affirmed on all
three grounds. Such a ruling would have been equally fair to the
defendant and more in the public interest.
B. IRvIN BOYLE,
M. T. VAN HECKE.
Evidence-Dying Declarations in North Carolina.
The North Carolina courts have recognized dying declarations as
competent evidence since 1815.1 The bases of this exception to the
general rule that all testimony must be given under oath and subject to
cross examination are that this kind of evidence is necessary and espe-
cially trustworthy. Even though other witnesses are available, still if
the deceased's information is to be availed of, his hearsay utterances
must be received. Moreover, in many cases the deceased was the only
witness, and a refusal to admit his statements would permit his assailant
to escape. Further, this type of declaration is especially trustworthy
' headle, Inherent Power of Judiciary Over Admittance to the Bar (1932) 7
WAs H. L. REv. 320; Green, The Court's Power over Admission and Disbarment(1925) 4 TEx. L. REv. 1; Lee, Constitutional Power of Courts over Admission to
Bar (1899) 13 HARv. L. REv. 233, 251; Bradway, Moral Turpitude as the Criterion
of Offenses that Justify Disbarment (1935) 24 CALM. L. REv. 9. See also STATE
BAR AcTs ANN. (1934 ed.) ; Note (1932) 16 MINN. L. REv. 857.5
'N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §255 (3).
'Attorney-General v. Knight 169 N. C. 335, 85 S. E. 418 (1915) (GeneralAssembly is without power to declare a public office is not such an office).
"Art. XIV, §7.
'Harris v. Watson, 201 N. C. 661, 161 S. E. 215 (1931).
The earliest case in which a dying declaration was admitted in evidence was
McFarland v. Shaw, 4 N. C. 200 (1815). In an earlier case, State v. Moody, 3
N. C. 31 (1798), the court refused to admit a dying declaration. Stone, J., said,
"How is it possible that a man can be a witness to prove -his own death ?" An-
other early case in which a dying declaration was held to be competent is State v.
Poll, 8 N. C. 442 (1821).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
because the conscious apprehension of the nearness of death is just as
strong an incentive to tell the truth as an oath.2
The early case of McFarland v. Shawv3 admitted a dying declaration
in a civil action for seduction, but this was overruled in Barfield v.
Britt4 where it was held that such declarations were only competent in
criminal prosecutions for homicide. A statute authorizing their intro-
duction in civil actions for wrongful death was passed in 1919. 5 There
seems to be no reason why the use of dying declarations should be so
restricted for if they are necessary and trustworthy in homicide and
wrongful death cases, why are they not equally necessary and trust-
worthy in other cases?
The trial judge must decide all preliminary questions upon which
the admissibility of the dying declaration depends. His determination
of the circumstances attendant upon the declaration is a finding of fact
which is conclusive, but his decision as to whether the declaration is ad-
missible in view of these facts is reviewable on appeal.6 In order for
the statement to be competent the declarant must be dead, and the dec-
laration must have been made while he was aware that he was in actual
danger of death. 7 It is not necessary that he should have been in the
very act of dying,8 and in one case the declaration was admitted even
though it was made five months before the declarant's death.9 Neither
2 Barfield v. Britt, 47 N. C. 41 (1854) ; State v. Jefferson, 125 N. C. 712, 34
S. E. 648 (1899) ; 3 WIGMORE, EvIDmEcE (2nd ed. 1923) §1431.
A typical argument against the admission of dying declarations is found in the
following language of Mr. Justice Green taken from his opinion in Railing v.
Commonwealth, 110 Pa. 100, 105 (1885) : "Nor is the reason ordinarily given for
their admission at all satisfactory. It is that the declarant in the immediate
presence of death is so conscious of the great responsibility awaiting him in the
near future if he utters falsehood, that he will in all human probability utter only
the truth. The fallacy of this reasoning has been many times demonstrated. It
leaves entirely out of account the influence of the passions of hatred and revenge
which almost all human beings naturally feel against their murderers, and it ig-
nores the -well known fact that persons guilty of murder, beyond all question, very
frequently deny their guilt up to the last -moment upon the scaffold."
34 N. C. 200 (1815). '47 N. C. 41 (1854).
r N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §160. The constitutionality of this statute
was upheld in Tatham v. Andrews Mfg. Co., 180 N. C. 627, 105 S. E. 423 (1920).
Other wrongful death cases involving the admissibility of dying declarations under
this statute are: Williams v. R. & C. Ry. Co., 182 N. C. 267, 108 S. E. 915 (1921) ;
Dellinger v. Elliott Building Co., 187 N. C. 845, 123 S. E. 78 (1924) ; Southwell
v. A. C. L. Ry. Co., 189 N. C. 417, 127 S. E. 361 (1925) ; Holmes v. Wharton,
194 N. C. 470, 140 S. E. 93 (1927).
' State v. Williams, 67 N. C_. 12 (1872).
7 State v. Mills, 91 N. C. 581 (1884) ; State v. Laughter, 159 N. C. 488, 74
S. E. 913 (1912). The dying declaration is not rendered incompetent because the
declarant did not say that he knew he was dying until after he had related the
facts about the affray. State v. Peace, 46 N. C. 251 (1854) ; State v. Quick, 150
N. C. 820, 64 S. E. 168 (1909).8 State v. Watkins, 159 N. C. 480, 75 S. E. 22 (1912).
' State v. Craine, 120 N. C. 601, 27 S. E. 72 (1897). See also State v. Black-
burn, 80 N. C. 478 (1879) (19 days elapsed between the two dates); State v.
Dalton, 206 N. C. 507, 174 S. E. 422 (1934) (7 days).
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is it necessary that he should state that he knows that he is dying. His
apprehension of his critical condition may be inferred from the sur-
rounding circumstances.' 0 If he actually believed that he was going to
die when he spoke, the statement is not rendered incompetent because
the declarant's hope of recovery was later revived." The declaration
will be incompetent, however, if the declarant, were he living, would
be disqualified to testify because of his insanity or infancy.' 2 In all
cases the declarations of the deceased victim are admissible in favor of
the defendant as well as against him.'3
The contents of a competent dying declaration must relate solely to
the facts and circumstances directly attending the act which caused the
declarant's death. 14 This restriction, like that which confines the use of
dying declarations to homicide and wrongful death cases, seems unjus-
tified because the statement is rendered no less trustworthy or necessary
because it relates to facts and circumstances antecedent to the factor
causing the declarant's death.
A dying declaration is not conclusive, its weight and credibility
being a matter for the jury to determine. 15 It may be impeached in the
same manner as any other sworn statement, 16 and if impeached it is
proper for the offeror to corroborate it by evidence of prior consistent
"State v. Finley, 118 N. C. 1161, 24 S. E. 495 (1896) (a doctor told declarant
that he was going to die) ; State v. Bagby, 158 N. C. 608, 73 S. E. 995 (1912)(doctor told declarant that he would die) ; State v. Watkins, 159 N. C. 480, 75
S. E. 22 (1912) (declarant stated that he did not want his -people to know about
his condition unless he was going to die; he immediately sent them a telegram
when the doctor told him he only had one chance in a hundred of getting well).
The opinion of the witness as to whether the declarant thought he would or would
not die is not competent testimony. State v. Tilghman, 33 N. C. 513 (1850) ; State
v. Layton, 204 N. C. 704, 169 S. E. 650 (1933) (doctor stated that declarant knew
that she was dying, elwd immaterial error because declarant also stated her ap-
prehension of approaching death) ; see State v. Franklin, 192 N. C. 723, 135 S. E.
859 (1926) ; State v. Ham, 205 N. C. 749, 172 S. E. 365 (1933) (testimony of
nurse that declarant knew that she was dying apparently received without ob-jection).ne State v. Tilgham, 33 N. C. 513 (1850) ; State v. Mills, 91 N. C. 581 (1884).
" See State v. Williams, 67 N. C. 12, 14 (1872).
"State v. Blackwell, 193 N. C. 313, 136 S. E. 868 (1927); State v. Mitchell,
209 N. C. 1, 182 S. E. 695 (1936).
"State v. Shelton, 47 N. C.. 360 (1855) ; State v. Dula, 61 N. C. 211 (1867);
State v. Jefferson, 125 N. C. 712, 34 S. E. 648 (1899) ; Dellinger v. Elliott Bldg.
Co., 187 N. C. 845, 123 S. E. 78 (1924); State v. Beal, 199 N. C. 278, 154 S. E.
604 (1930).
1 State v. Tilghman, 33 N. C. 513 (1850) ; State v. Davis, 134 N. C. 633, 46
S. E. 722 (1904) ; State v. Watkins, 159 N. C. 480, 75 S. E. 22 (1912).
"State v. Thomason, 46 N. C. 274 (1854) (evidence that declarant had a bad
character for truth and veracity) ; State v. Blackburn, 80 N. C. 478 (1879) (con-
tradicted on the facts by the testimony of other witnesses) ; State v. Davis, 134
N. C. 633, 46 S. E. 722 (1904) (doctor testified that declarant was in such bad
condition that his memory had been impaired); State v. Williams, 168 N. C.
191, 83 S. E. 714 (1914) (contradicted on the facts) ; State v. Ham, 205 N. C.
749, 172 S. E. 365 (1933) (evidence that declarant -was drunk when she made the
dying declaration).
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statements or by evidence of the declarant's good character.17 This
rule provides the opening for a logical inconsistency because where the
deceased's testimony has been impeached by the introduction of prior
contradictory statements, corroborative evidence of good character for
truth and veracity is not strictly relevant. The fact that the declaration
is fragmentary and incomplete does not render it incompetent but only
affects its credibility before the jury.18 At the request of the opposing
party the judge must instruct the jury to receive the dying declaration
with caution and without superstition,19 but in the absence of a specific
request it is not a reversible error for him to omit to make such a
charge.20
In State v. Williams2l the court held that a dying declaration is in-
"1 State v. Thomason, 46 N. C. 274 (1854) (prior consistent oral statement
which was inadmissible by itself) ; State v. Blackburn, 80 N. C. 478 (1879) ; State
v. Craine, 120 S. E. 601, 27 S. E. 72 (1897) (corroborative evidence was affidavit
taken immediately after the affray) ; State v. Williams, 168 N. C. 191, 83 S. E.
714 (1914) (prior consistent oral statements and evidence of declarant's good
character).
The witness who testifies to the dying declarations may refer to some mem-
oranda to refresh his memory. State v. Whitson, 111 N. C. 695, 16 S. E. 332
(1892) ; State v. Finley, 118 N. C. 1161, 24 S. E. 495 (1896) ; State v. Teachey,
138 N. C. 587, 50 S. E. 232 (1905).
'State v. Brinkley, 183 N. C. 720, 110 S. E. 783 (1922) ; State v. Collins, 189
N. C. 15, 126 S. E. 98 (1924).
The declaration is not rendered inadmissible against a particular defendant
because the declarant 'was unable to identify his assailant by name. State v. Wal-
lace, 203 N. C. 284, 165 S. E. 716 (1932) ("A yellow negro shot me.") ; State v.
Layton, 204 N. C. 704, 169 S. E. 650 (1933) ; State v. Beard, 207 N. C. 673, 178
S. E. 242 (1934) (declarant stated that the man who shot him didn't live in
Valdese but had been hanging around town for several weeks).
"State v. Whitson, 111 N. C. 695, 16 S. E. 332 (1892) ; State v. Kennedy, 169
N. C. 326, 85 S. E. 42 (1915) ; State v. Williams, 185 N. C. 643, 116 S. E. 570
(1923).
o State v. Collins, 189 N. C. 15, 126 S. E. 98 (1924).
167 N. C. 12 (1872). There has naturally been some diversity of opinion as
to what statements constitute opinion and what constitute fact. State v. Williams,
67 N. C. 12 (1872) (statement: "It was E. W. who shot me though I didn't see
him." Held: opinion); State v. Mace, 118 N. C. 1244, 24 S. E. 798 (1896)
("They have murdered me for nothing in the world." Held: not a statement of
opinion as to the degree of the homicide) ; State v. Jefferson, 125 N. C. 712, 34
S. E. 648 (1899) (". . . have 3. arrested ...we had an argument . . . later I
was shot from ambush ... saw a man running out of bushes but it was too dark
for -me to recognize -him." Held: opinion) ; State v. Dixon, 131 N. C. 808, 42
S. E. 944" (1902) (declarant stated that his assailant was a small white man, that
he looked like Dixon, and when he ran off, he ran like him. Held: fact);
State v. Watkins, 159 N. C. 480, 75 S. E. 22 (1912) ("Why did he shoot me? I
have done nothing to be shot for." Held: fact) ; State v. Williams, 168 N. C. 191, 83
S. E. 714 (1914) (declarant stated that W. shot him "without cause." Held:
fact) ; State v. Beal, 199 N. C. 278, 154 S. E. 604 (1930) ("I do not know why
they shot me in the back and killed me. I didn't do anything." Held: fact) ;
State v. Stone, 204 N. C. 666, 169 S. E. 277 (1933) (declarant stated that he didn't
know who shot him, but that he thought S did it. Held: this evidence might well
have been excluded but defendant can't complain because he did not object at the
trial). Cf. State v. Arnold, 35 N. C. 184 (1851) ("Great God! A has killed
me." Held: statement of fact even though the facts showed that declarant could
not have seen his assailant) ; State v. Franklin, 192 N. C. 723, 135 S. E. 859 (1926)
(declarant's statement that defendant's motive was an old grudge was admitted).
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admissible if it is a statement of opinion. The theory behind the
opinion rule is that wherever the witness can state the facts on which
he bases his opinion, the jury is equally competent to draw the infer-
ences and the witness' conclusion is superfluous.22 Wigmore in his
treatise on Evidence argues that the rule should not be applied to dying
-declarations because the declarant is dead and it is not possible to ob-
tain from him the data on which he based his inference.23 In Statc v.
Watkins24 the North Carolina Supreme Court, in effect, reached such
a result by holding that if there were any doubt as to whether the
declaration was opinion or fact the judge should submit it to the jury
with instructions to disregard it if they should find that it was intended
to be a: statement of opinion. The opinion rule is thus obviated because
once the evidence is submitted to the jury it is, practically speaking,
impossible for them to disregard it altogether even though they do de-
cide that it is a statement of opinion.
N. A. TOWNSEND, JR.
Evidence--Rules of Evidence in Preliminary Controversies
As to Admissibility of Testimony.
H was charged with the murder of his wife, W, and his defense was
that the shot was fired accidentally. Over his objection the trial court
permitted a witness for the state to testify that immediately after the
shooting W had said that she was not going to live, that she wouldn't
live to get to the hospital if they didn't hurry, and that H had shot her.
W died three days after these statements were made. On appeal
the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the evidence had been
properly admitted as a dying declaration.1
As a general rule the unsworn declarations of a deceased person are
admissible as an exception to the "hearsay rule" if made while the
declarant was fully aware of his impending death.2 In determining
whether a certain declaration falls within the exception the trial judge
must first make a finding of fact on which to base his decision.3 In the
instant case the only facts upon which he ruled that the declarant was
under an apprehension of death were those contained in the hearsay
'3 WIGmORF, EViDExCE (2nd ed. 1923) §1447.
3 WIGMOE, loc. cit. supra, note 22.
159 N. C. 480, 75 S. E. 22 (1912). This rule was followed in: State v. Wil-
liams, 168 N. C. 191, 83 S. E. 714 (1914) ; State v. Beal, 199 N. C. 278, 154 S. E.
604 (1930).
Another peculiarity of this rule is that the jury is applying a rule of evidence.
Ordinarily the application of the rules of evidence is left to the trial judge. State
v. Williams, 67 N. C. 12 (1872).
1 State v. Carden, 209 N. C. 404, 183 S. E. 898 (1936).
- State v. Mills, 91 N. C. 581 (1884) ; Note (1936) 14 N. C. L. Ray. 380.
'State v. Williams, 67 N. C. 12 (1872).
